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When Bigger Is Better: A Critique
of the Herfindahl-Hirschman
Index’s Use to Evaluate Mergers
in Network Industries
Toby Roberts*
I.

Introduction

The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (“HHI”) operates under a
very simple premise: industry behavior strongly correlates with
industry structure; the larger a firm is within its industry, the
more likely it is to engage in supracompetitive pricing or other
anticompetitive conduct.1 For more than 30 years, antitrust
regulators have used the index to gauge whether prospective
mergers would produce a firm of such magnitude that it would
adversely impact societal welfare. When an HHI analysis of an
impending merger suggests that a potentially harmful increase
in concentration will result, the companies involved must
demonstrate that the merger has other characteristics that
mitigate its impact on prices in order to gain regulatory
approval.2
* Staff attorney at the California Court of Appeal and former law
clerk at the United States District Court for the Central District of
California and the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit. The views expressed in this Article are solely those of the
author and do not reflect those of any court or judge. The author
wishes to thank Professor Daniel Rubinfeld for his extremely helpful
comments on an early draft of this Article and Dr. George Radics for
encouraging its publication.
1. See generally Dennis C. Mueller, Lessons from the United
States’s Antitrust History, 14 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 415 (1996)
(discussing the history of economic analysis in antitrust and citing
the wide body of literature correlating structure with behavior). This
paper will focus solely on the consumer welfare effects from increases
in post-merger price.
2. For example, in many industries a post-merger firm will have
lower unit costs due to economies of scale, which, in the absence of
increased market power, tend to decrease prices. The Merger
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One result of reliance on the HHI has been an erroneous
conflation of market power (as proxied by market share) with
consumer disutility. Although the close relationship between
the two holds up in general, one significant exception arises in
network industries. Network firms benefit consumers
commensurately with their size. For example, given the choice
between two equally priced credit cards, one accepted by
merchants nationwide and the other by only half, most people
would prefer to own the card with greater acceptance. Many
people would willingly pay at least somewhat higher interest
rates or greater fees for access to the larger network because
the benefit of owning a universally accepted credit card
outweighs the additional cost. But what if the larger network
didn’t exist? What if only smaller credit card companies
existed? And what if two of those smaller firms desired to
merge but could not offer the government a compelling reason
why they would not subsequently exercise their increased
market power to raise prices?
This Article argues that the current framework used by
the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and Federal Trade
Commission (“FTC”) to evaluate mergers is inadequate in that
it fails to account for network benefits. In particular, I argue
for abandoning the use of the HHI in analyzing network
industry mergers because the index generates little useful
information about these mergers’ effect on consumer welfare.
Part II describes the HHI’s historical and theoretical
underpinnings and its integration into the current Merger
Guidelines. Part III considers general objections to the HHI
before turning to its problems in evaluating network
industries. Part IV presents a formal model for evaluating the
effects of mergers in network industries. Part V proposes an
alternative framework for merger analysis to account for
network effects. Part VI concludes.

Guidelines allow for such “efficiencies” to offset the anticompetitive
concerns posed by large-scale consolidation. See infra Part II.B.
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II. History of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index
A. The Search for an Optimal Measure of Concentration
1. Early Measures of Concentration: The Golden Age of
Graphs3
Statistical indexes of industrial concentration grew out of
attempts by economists and statisticians in the early twentieth
century to measure income distribution and inequality.4
Theorists agreed that a society in which all members enjoyed
equal incomes exhibited no income concentration; likewise, a
state of affairs in which all income accrued to just one person
would constitute the highest concentration possible.5 The
difficulty lay in developing a statistic that would meaningfully
describe levels of inequality that fell between these antipodean
states.6
Initial efforts proved fruitless because the models exhibited
sensitivity to absolute income levels, rendering them useless
for international or intertemporal comparisons.7 In 1905, Max
Otto Lorenz published a seminal paper on the subject of wealth

3. See JUDY L. KLEIN, STATISTICAL VISIONS IN TIME: A HISTORY OF
TIME SERIES ANALYSIS, 1662–1938 17 (1997) (describing the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as “the golden stage for
graphs,” bridging periods of predominantly tabular and algebraic
presentation of statistical data).
4. See ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, NATIONAL POWER AND THE
STRUCTURE OF FOREIGN TRADE 157 (1945).
5. See Michael Schneider, Measuring Inequality: The Origins of
the Lorenz Curve and the Gini Coefficient 6-8 (2000) (unpublished
manuscript),
available
at
http://www.latrobe.edu.au/data/assets/pdf_file/0011/130889/2004.01.p
df.
6. See id.
7. For instance, in 1895 Vilfredo Pareto observed a linear
logarithmic relationship between income level, x, and the number of
persons above a given income level, n: log n = log A – α log x (where A
and α are constants). Pareto proposed using α as a measure of
concentration. His model fell prey to criticism, which asserted not
only that α was sensitive to absolute income levels irrespective of
concentration, but that α was insensitive to changes in income by the
highest earning individual or group. See id. at 6.
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concentration.8 Lorenz proposed graphing the percent of
individuals on the horizontal axis, arranged from poorest to
richest, and their cumulative wealth on the vertical axis.9 By
using percentages rather than absolute wealth levels, Lorenz
avoided the pitfalls that had ensnared his contemporaries.
The Lorenz curve, as the procedure became known, is
illustrated in Figure 1(a) for two hypothetical countries.
Country A has a more egalitarian wealth distribution than
country B, given that curve A lies entirely above curve B,
except at the endpoints. The straight line connecting the two
endpoints—the equal distribution line—represents a situation
of zero concentration.10

100

100

Percent of Total Wealth

Percent of Total Wealth

Figure 1.

0

A
B

Percent of Individuals

(a)

100

0

C

D
Percent of Individuals

100

(b)

8. M.O. Lorenz, Methods of Measuring the Concentration of
Wealth, 9 PUBL’NS AM. STAT. ASS’N 209 (1905).
9. See id. at 216-19. Lorenz was inconsistent about which axis
should depict “Percent of Number” and which should depict “Percent
of Total Wealth.” Gini followed his textual description rather than his
graphs, as do I. Compare id. at 217-18, with Corrado Gini, Sulla
Misura della Concentrazione e della Variabilità dei Caratteri, 73 ATTI
DEL REALE ISTITUTO VENETO DI SCIENZE, LETTERE ED ARTI 1203, 1229
(1914).
10. More formally, on the line of equal distribution, x percent of
the population holds y = x percent of the wealth.
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The situation illustrated by Figure 1(b) presents
ambiguity: both countries C and D exhibit some degree of
inequality in wealth distribution, but the Lorenz curves do not
clearly show which country has the greater concentration of
wealth. At the point where the curves cross, the richer and
poorer cohorts in country C hold, respectively, the same
percentages of total assets as in country D. In country C, there
is less variance in wealth among the poorer cohort of the
population and more disparity among the richer cohort relative
to country D.
Italian statisticians, in particular Corrado Gini, devised a
general method for comparing two or more Lorenz curves.11
Gini had been working independently on a measure of
inequality.12 The traditional statistical measure of inequality—
variance—focuses on the dispersion from a population’s
arithmetic mean. Gini came to believe that, in certain social
science contexts, the appropriate measure of inequality should
consider not “how much [] diverse outlying quantities differ
from their arithmetic mean[,]” but rather “how much [] diverse
actual magnitudes differ [from] each other.”13 He proposed an
index of inequality that measured the “mean difference” in a
population, obtained by taking every possible pair of
observations, recording the absolute difference in value for
each pair, and computing the average difference across all of
the pairs.14
Gini demonstrated that the “mean difference” is equal to
the area between the Lorenz curve and the line of equal
distribution.15 This relationship allowed a comparison between
any two Lorenz curves—whichever curve had the greater area
between it and the line of equal distribution represented the
greater degree of inequality. Gini’s coefficient of concentration,
11. See HIRSCHMAN, supra note 4, at 157-58 n.2.
12. See Schneider, supra note 5, at 11, 15 n.16.
13. Id. at 12 (citation omitted).
14. See HIRSCHMAN, supra note 4, at 157-58 n.2. In a population
of n observations where each observation has a value of xi (i  1, 2,
. . . , n), the mean difference is equal to:
(

)

∑∑

15. See Gini, supra note 9, at 1229-33.
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still in use today, took the area bounded by the Lorenz curve
and line of equal distribution, and divided it by the entire
triangular area underneath the line of equal distribution.16
As a measure of concentration, the Lorenz-Gini measure
works well when the resource under measurement is allocated
over a sufficiently large number of observations, such as in the
distribution of wealth or income across a society. As applied to
industrial concentration, however, the Gini Index fails to
provide crucial information about the number of firms in the
industry. Figure 2 illustrates the problem.
Figure 2.

0

Cumulative Market Share

100

Cumulative Market Share

100

Percent of Firms

(a)

100

0

Percent of Firms

100

(b)

Figure 2(a) depicts the Lorenz curve for a five-firm
industry with market shares of 5%, 10%, 15%, 30%, and 40%.
The Gini coefficient for this industry is .36, which indicates a
moderate amount of concentration. Suppose that the firm with
a 30% market share acquires the firms with 5% and 15%
16. See HIRSCHMAN, supra note 4, at 157-58 n.2. If the Lorenz
curve is obtained by sampling from the population, then this estimate
of the Gini coefficient is biased, necessitating a multiplier of n/(n – 1).
In many industrial organization contexts, no such correction is
needed because the Lorenz curve is calculated from a complete
population.
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shares, while the firm with a 40% share merges with the
remaining firm, such that a two-firm industry emerges in
which each company enjoys a 50% market share. Figure 2(b)
depicts the post-merger Lorenz curve. The Gini coefficient for
the duopoly is 0, paradoxically indicating less concentration
than before the consolidation. This is because the Gini Index
measures only disparity in market share without regard to the
absolute size of any firm’s share. The Lorenz curve in figure
2(b) would look the same no matter how many firms were in
the industry provided that each had an equal market share.
2. Other Attempts at Measuring Market Power
a. Concentration Ratios
One persistent yet unilluminating tool for measuring
industry concentration is the concentration ratio.17 It sums the
market shares of the largest x firms in an industry, where x is
typically 2, 4, or 8. This measure has been used since the time
of the New Deal programs, when large volumes of industry
statistics became increasingly available.18 The concentration
ratio provides little information about an industry’s actual
structure—it does not even amount to a point on a Lorenz
curve.19 Furthermore, a concentration ratio reveals nothing
about the inequality among either the top x firms or the bottom
17. For general criticisms of concentration ratios, see, e.g.,
Michael O. Finkelstein & Richard M. Friedberg, The Application of
an Entropy Theory of Concentration to the Clayton Act, 76 YALE L.J.
677, 679-83 (1967).
18. See, e.g., TEMP. NAT’L ECON. COMM., INVESTIGATION OF
CONCENTRATION OF ECONOMIC POWER, 76TH CONG., 274-75 (Comm.
Print
1941),
available
at
https://archive.org/details/investigationofc27unit. The authors offer
no justification for either their use of a concentration ratio or their
choice of four rather than some other number of firms.
19. Without knowledge of how many firms comprise an industry,
a concentration ratio provides only enough information to place a
point on the vertical axis of a Lorenz curve; the point could fall
anywhere to the right of the line of equal concentration, depending on
the total number of firms. See Orris Clemens Herfindahl,
Concentration in the Steel Industry 8-9 (1950) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, Columbia University) (on file with the Columbia
University Library).
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n – x firms. For instance, an eight-firm industry dominated by
one firm with a 65% market share followed by seven firms each
with 5% market shares presumably would behave very
differently than an industry in which the top four firms each
had shares of 20% and the next four largest firms had shares of
5%. Yet the four-firm concentration ratio (CR-4) for both
industries is the same—80%.
Concentration ratios have long held sway with courts in
determining the competitive impact of mergers,20 particularly
after the DOJ formally adopted the four-firm concentration
ratio in its initial 1968 Merger Guidelines.21 The subsequent
1982 Guidelines ended the formal use of concentration ratios in
favor of the HHI, and courts followed suit.22 Although no longer
part of the formal DOJ and FTC merger review process,
concentration ratios nonetheless continue to appear in opinions
considering Sherman and Clayton Act claims.23
b. Lerner Index
Economists predicated their search for a measure of
industrial concentration on the assumption that an industry’s
structure influenced the conduct of its component firms—
20. See, e.g., United States v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486
(1974) (discussing the Clayton Act); United States v. Von’s Grocery
Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966) (discussing the Clayton Act); United States
v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963) (discussing the Clayton and
Sherman Acts).
21. 1968
Merger
Guidelines,
DEP’T
OF
JUSTICE,
http://www.justice.gov/atr/hmerger/11247.pdf (last visited Jan. 30,
2014) [hereinafter 1968 Merger Guidelines].
22. See FTC v. PPG Indus., Inc., 798 F.2d 1500, 1503 (D.C. Cir.
1986) (“The FTC and the Department of Justice, as well as most
economists, consider the [HHI] measure superior to such cruder
measures as the four- or eight-firm concentration ratios which merely
sum up the market shares of the largest four or eight firms . . . . This
method, unlike the four- and eight-firm concentration ratios, shows
higher market power as the disparity in size between firms increases
and as the number of firms outside the first four or eight decreases.”).
23. See, e.g., Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc.,
551 U.S. 877, 922-23 (2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting); Todd v. Exxon
Corp., 275 F.3d 191, 208-09 (2d Cir. 2001); United States v.
Manitowoc Co., No. 02-1509, 2002 WL 32060288, at *1 (D.D.C. Dec.
11, 2002); R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Philip Morris Inc., 199 F.
Supp. 2d 362, 367 (M.D.N.C. 2002).
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conduct which in turn affected the degree of market power that
individual firms enjoyed.24 This aptly named structure-conductperformance (“SCP”) paradigm continues to enjoy cachet with
both economists and courts.25 Under the SCP framework, the
purpose of a concentration measure is to provide as accurate a
proxy as possible for the actual degree of monopoly power
exhibited by firms.
The economist Abba Lerner questioned the need for such
theoretical abstractions, proposing a more direct measure of
monopoly power.26 The Lerner Index (L), as his formula has
become known, is a straightforward measurement of a firm’s
profits:
where L is the index coefficient, p is the price at which a firm
sells a particular good, and c is the firm’s marginal cost of
producing the good. The Lerner Index thus avoids the
difficulties inherent in choosing the relevant group of firms and
products that comprise a given industry or market. Instead, it
directly assesses the ability of a particular firm to charge a
supracompetitive price for a particular product.27
Despite its theoretical attractiveness, the Lerner Index has
garnered substantial criticism primarily leveled at its viability
as a practical tool. Measurements of marginal cost are rarely, if
ever, straightforward.28 Small changes in the methodological
24. See Richard Gilbert & Oliver Williamson, Antitrust Policy, in
1 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 82
(Peter Newman ed., 1998).
25. See, e.g., In re Urethane Antitrust Litig., No. 04-1616-JWL,
2012 WL 6681783, at *3 (D. Kan. Dec. 21, 2012) (“[S]tructureconduct-performance analysis by an economist is well-accepted in
[antitrust economics].”); TC Sys. Inc. v. Town of Colonie, 213 F. Supp.
2d 171, 183 (N.D.N.Y. 2002) (recognizing that “the S-C-P paradigm
‘enjoys a long history and wide acceptance in the economic literature
and in the antitrust courts’”).
26. See generally A.P. Lerner, The Concept of Monopoly and the
Measurement of Monopoly Power, 1 REV. ECON. STUD. 157 (1934).
27. This follows from the classical economic assumption that in a
perfectly competitive industry firms choose to produce an output level
at which the market-bearing price equals their marginal cost. See,
e.g., ROBERT S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMICS
267 (6th ed. 2005).
28. The American Airlines predatory pricing case illustrates the
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assumptions for calculating marginal cost can lead to wildly
divergent estimates of monopolistic profits.29 Moreover, shortterm demand shocks will change prices and, with them, the
value of L, despite there being no underlying shift in a firm’s
market power.30
Even where accurate marginal cost calculations are
possible, the Lerner Index often fails to reflect the competitive
realities of a market. In a highly competitive industry where
each firm faces a high, one-time sunk cost, the firms will need
to recoup that cost, leading to prices above the industry-wide
marginal cost. The Lerner Index would then falsely indicate
the presence of some monopoly power.31 Conversely, a firm
with relatively high marginal costs may engage in predatory
behavior and other tactics in order to preclude a potential rival
with lower marginal costs from entering the market. By
focusing on the incumbent firm rather than the more efficient
potential entrant, the Lerner Index would paint a more
sanguine picture of the competitive conditions than actually
warranted.32 Because the Lerner Index presents formidable
difficulties involved in calculating marginal costs. See United States
v. AMR Corp., 335 F.3d 1109 (10th Cir. 2003). In 1999, the
Government brought suit against American under Section 2 of the
Sherman Act, alleging that American had responded illegally to new
entrants in various markets involving its Dallas hub. Id. at 1111-13.
In each case, American had expanded capacity, matched its rivals’
low fares, and made those fares readily available. Id.
Notwithstanding the significant drop in average fares in the relevant
markets, the district court held for the airline and the Tenth Circuit
affirmed, noting that “marginal cost, an economic abstraction, is
notoriously difficult to measure and ‘cannot be determined from
conventional accounting methods.’” Id. at 1116 (citations omitted).
The courts rejected all four measures of incremental costs proposed
by the government, finding it undisputed that American had priced
above average variable costs, a proxy for marginal costs. Id. at 1120.
29. See LYNNE PEPALL ET AL., INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION:
CONTEMPORARY THEORY & PRACTICE 55 (3d ed. 2005); see also Ian
Domowitz et al., Market Structure and Cyclical Fluctuations in U.S.
Manufacturing, 70 REV. ECON. & STAT. 55 (1988); Robert E. Hall, The
Relation Between Price and Marginal Cost in U.S. Industry, 96 J.
POL. ECON. 921 (1988).
30. See IIB PHILLIP E. AREEDA ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW: AN
ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION ¶ 505 (3d
ed. 2007).
31. See PEPALL ET AL., supra note 29, at 54.
32. HERBERT J. HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE
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practical difficulties, it has remained a theoretical construct
not often used as a regulatory tool.33
3. The Herfindahl-Hirschman Solution
Albert Hirschman recognized the limitations of using the
Lorenz-Gini methodology in an industrial organization context.
In the appendix to his 1945 book on international trade,
Hirschman pointed out the need for a measure of concentration
that took into account not only equality of market shares, but
also the number of total competitors:
[T]he number of elements in a series the
concentration of which is being measured is an
important consideration. This is so whenever
concentration means “control by the few,” i.e.,
particularly
in
connection
with
market
phenomena. . . One of the well-known conditions
of perfect competition is that no individual seller
should command an important share of the total
market supply; this condition implies the
presence of both relative equality of distribution
and of large numbers.34
To this end, Hirschman argued that any index purporting
to measure industrial concentration should increase as the
dispersion in market shares increases and decrease as the
number of firms increases.35
Hirschman proposed the following concentration index:
√∑ (

)

where n is the number of firms, qj is the output (or sales,
profits, etc.) of the jth firm, and Q is the industry’s total
LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE 245-46 (3d ed. 1994).
33. See AREEDA ET AL., supra note 30, at ¶ 504.
34. HIRSCHMAN, supra note 4, at 158.
35. Id. at 160.
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output.36 Hirschman demonstrated that his index could be
expressed equivalently as
√
where v is the coefficient of variation, equal to
, or the
standard deviation of the series divided by its arithmetic
mean.37
By breaking down the index into two components—one
dependent on number of firms, n, and one dependent on the
relative inequality of market shares, v—Hirschman fulfilled his
self-imposed criteria. The index grows smaller as n increases
and larger as v increases.
Five years later, Orris Herfindahl independently reached a
very similar solution to the inadequacies of the Lorenz curve in
measuring industrial concentration.38 Examining concentration
in the steel industry for his PhD dissertation, he proposed the
familiar index:
∑
)
(∑
which is functionally equivalent to Hirschman’s index except
for the square root sign and the scale.39 As did Hirschman,
Herfindahl noted that his index could be expressed as a
relationship between the number of firms and the coefficient of
variation.40 Herfindahl surpassed Hirschman, however, in both
36. Id. at 159.
37. Id. The number 100 in the formulas merely allows the index
to be expressed on a scale between 0 and 100; otherwise it would fall
on the interval [0, 1]. Legal applications, following the practice in the
Merger Guidelines, typically express the HHI on a scale of 0 to
10,000. Hirschman offers no reason for his use of the square root sign
in the formulas.
38. See generally Herfindahl, supra note 19. Herfindahl,
apparently unaware of Hirschman’s earlier work at the time he began
writing, acknowledges it in a footnote but adds that Hirschman “did
not view the index as a weighted average nor give a graphic
representation.” Id. at 21 n.1.
39. See id. at 19. Hirschman offered no reason for his use of the
square root sign. He may have simply applied it to his formula for the
sake of balance.
40. See id. at 20.
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his recognition of the legal applications and his conception of
how to apply the index in such a context.
[A]nti-trust law is assigning the size structure of
firms a greater importance than formerly.
Something less than one hundred per cent
control of an industry is sufficient to make a
showing of monopoly under the Sherman Act
even in the absence of traditional acts in
restraint of trade. The law will undoubtedly
continue to use summary ideas resting on the
size structure of firms. The economist will
perform an important service if he can develop a
more adequate account of the relationships
between measures of concentration and market
behavior.41
While acknowledging the imprecision with which any
structural index indicated monopoly performance, Herfindahl
suggested that his index might aid antitrust policy as a costefficient means of detection.42 Presciently, he remarked that a
strict reliance on his index would incur costs “through the
harassment of some industries whose performance is actually
quite competitive but whose structure, by the conventional
standards, is not.”43
Indeed, Herfindahl felt that any index of concentration had
only a limited usefulness, as it would comprise only “one, or at
most a few, of the many variables that determine the degree of
monopoly in an industry.”44 In addition to the number of firms
and the inequality of their market shares, he suggested several
other factors that influence an industry’s performance, such as
the individual firms’ “locational distribution,” the “psychology”
of corporate officers, and varying degrees of product
substitutability.45 Because structural indices have at best a
limited correlation with industry performance, Herfindahl felt
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id. at 3 (footnote omitted).
See id. at 171.
Id.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 19, 170.

13

2014]

WHEN BIGGER IS BETTER

907

that his index should serve as just one tool among many in the
application of antitrust policy.46
4. Towards an HHI Standard
Following the completion of Herfindahl’s thesis, the HHI
began to gain acceptance among industrial organization
economists, in no small part due to the influence of
Herfindahl’s doctoral advisor, George Stigler.47 The HHI had
many attractive features for an index of concentration, both
practical and theoretical.
One problem that plagued early forays into the study of
industry structure was the lack of complete data and the lack
of computing power to analyze the information available. The
HHI advantageously required no complicated mathematical
algorithms in its computation—merely addition and
multiplication.
In the decades before the information age, many
economists voiced concern that information about industry
structure often only encompassed the largest firms in the
industry, potentially omitting many if not most market
participants.48 This problem explains the popularity of the
concentration ratio indexes despite their theoretical
shortcomings. In theory, the HHI necessitated knowledge of
every firm’s market share, yet in practice one could often
generate a very precise HHI approximation using only a few
firms.49 Moreover, to calculate the change in the index that a
potential merger would produce, as is the current practice, it is
necessary to know only the market shares of the two firms
involved.50
46. See id. at 169-72.
47. See Stephen Calkins, The New Merger Guidelines and the
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 402, 409 (1983).
48. See, e.g., Duncan Bailey & Stanley E. Boyle, The Optimal
Measure of Concentration, 66 J. AM. STAT. ASS’N 702, 703 (1971)
(observing the prevailing assumption “that ‘better’ indexes could be
developed if more detailed firm data were available”).
49. See HIRSCHMAN, supra note 4, at 160-62.
50. If two merging firms have market shares x1 and x2, then the
change in HHI is equivalent to 2x1x2. See 1997 Merger Guidelines,
DEP’T
OF
JUSTICE
&
FTC
14
n.
8,
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The index also allowed for an easy practical interpretation.
Taking the inverse of the HHI yields the number of “effective
competitors,” or the number of equal-sized firms that would
produce an equivalent HHI score.51 The DOJ used this
interpretation when it introduced the HHI in 1982.52
In addition, Herfindahl’s index has an attractive
theoretical link to the Lerner Index via a Cournot oligopoly
model.53 The economist Augustin Cournot, utilizing a
framework that anticipated game theory by more than 100
years, demonstrated that two firms competing on output and
letting the market forces determine the price would wind up
selling at a price between that of a monopolist and that in a
perfectly competitive market.54 An extension of the Cournot
duopoly model to include any number of firms reveals that as
the number of firms decreases, the equilibrium price increases,
the Lerner Index increases, and the HHI increases.55 As the
number of firms tends toward infinity, the equilibrium price
http://www.justice.gov/atr/hmerger/11251.pdf (last visited Jan. 30,
2014) [hereinafter 1997 Merger Guidelines].
51. See M.A. Adelman, Comment on the “H” Concentration
Measure as a Numbers-Equivalent, 51 REV. ECON. & STAT. 99, 101
(1969). For an example of the use of the phrase “effective competitors”
in this context, see Steven A. Morrison & Clifford Winston, The
Dynamics of Airline Pricing and Competition, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 389,
390 (1990). But see George Eads, Intercity Passenger Transportation:
Airline Capacity Limitation Controls: Public Vice or Public Virtue? 64
AM. ECON. REV. 365, 367 (1974) (using “effective competitors” to
denote those firms with a market share of greater than 10%).
52. See 1982 Merger Guidelines, DEP’T OF JUSTICE 1, 14,
http://www.justice.gov/atr/hmerger/11248.pdf (last visited Jan. 30,
2012) [hereinafter 1982 Merger Guidelines] (explaining that markets
with an HHI above 1,800 “hav[e] the equivalent of no more than
approximately six equally sized firms”).
53. See TROUT RADER, A THEORY OF MICROECONOMICS 271-76
(1972); Robert E. Dansby & Robert D. Willig, Industry Performance
Gradient Indexes, 69 AM. ECON. REV. 249 (1979).
54. See
AUGUSTIN
COURNOT,
RESEARCHES
INTO
THE
MATHEMATICAL PRINCIPLES OF THE THEORY OF WEALTH 79-89
(Nathaniel T. Bacon trans., 1897) (1838).
55. Cournot made this extension. For a modern exposition, see
PEPALL ET AL., supra note 29, at 215-23. Formally, the relationship is
̅
HHI
where ̅ is the weighted average industry marginal cost and
price elasticity of demand.

is the
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approaches the perfectly competitive level, and the Lerner and
Herfindahl-Hirschman Indexes approach zero.56
Of course, the Cournot model is not itself without
detractors—one important early critic pointed out that many
firms compete on price rather than output.57 Nonetheless, it
remains a workhorse in the field of industrial organization
because it explains, using a very simple model of firm behavior,
why a decreasing number of firms tends to result in an
increasing ability to coordinate output and pricing, even in the
absence of tacit collusion. Thus, the Herfindahl-Cournot-Lerner
models provide a theoretical justification for the structureconduct-performance paradigm.
B.

The Merger Guidelines

In the same year that Herfindahl submitted his doctoral
dissertation, Congress passed the Celler-Kefauver Act,58 which
broadened the government’s power to challenge mergers and
marked the beginning of modern merger law.59 The DOJ and
FTC originally derived their power to review and approve
mergers from Section 7 of the Clayton Act,60 and Federal Trade
Commission Act,61 respectively.62 The Celler-Kefauver Act,

56. See id.
57. See Joseph Bertrand, Review of Theorie Mathematique de la
Richesse Sociale and of Recherches sur les Principles Mathematiques
de la Theorie des Richesses, 68 J. DES SAVANTS 499 (1883).
58. Pub. L. No. 899, 64 Stat. 1125 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 18, 21
(2012)).
59. See William J. Kolasky & Andrew R. Dick, The Merger
Guidelines and the Integration of Efficiencies into Antitrust Review of
Horizontal Mergers, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 207, 210-12 (2003). The first
major case to apply the Celler-Kefauver legislation and provide an
interpretation of its impact on merger regulation was Brown Shoe Co.
v United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
60. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2012).
61. Id. § 45. The Act precludes the FTC from evaluating bank and
airline mergers. See id. § 45(a)(2).
62. Most actions to enjoin mergers invoke the Clayton Act. The
Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2, also grants the federal government
power to stop mergers “in restraint of trade” or those that monopolize
or attempt to monopolize a market. See Constance K. Robinson,
Mergers and Acquisitions, in 1 CORPORATE LAW AND PRACTICE
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enacted at a time of great concern over “a rising tide of
economic concentration in the American economy,” gave teeth
to the existing antitrust legislation by closing a number of
loopholes and granting the government the power to curb any
potential lessening of competition at its outset.63
In 1968 the DOJ issued, for the first time, a set of
guidelines explaining its approach to merger evaluation.64 This
document had two notable features: a focus on market
structure and the use of the four-firm concentration ratio as a
measurement tool.65
By concentrating its merger analysis on a few structural
factors, the DOJ argued that it would “produce economic
predictions that are fully adequate for the purposes of [the
Clayton Act].”66 Additionally, its approach promoted efficient
decision-making and provided transparency to industry
participants.67 The DOJ thus adopted the prevailing belief by
economists that industry performance cannot be measured in
any consistent or accurate way, and that industry structure
serves as a useful proxy.
The DOJ accorded “primary significance” to market shares
in assessing market structure for horizontal merger
evaluations.68 For fourteen years, this meant using the CR-4.69
Industries received a classification of either “Highly
Concentrated”—those with a CR-4 of 75% or more—and “Less
Highly Concentrated”—those with a CR-4 of less than 75%.70
Concentration ratios do not convey sufficient information for a

COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES: 45TH ANNUAL ANTITRUST LAW INSTITUTE
297, 303 (2004).
63. Brown Shoe Co., 370 U.S. at 315-20.
64. The Guidelines limit discussion to merger analysis under the
Clayton Act only. 1968 Merger Guidelines, supra note 21, at 1.
65. See id. at 1-2, 14-15.
66. Id. at 1-2.
67. See id.
68. See id. at 5.
69. See id. at 6.
70. Id. at 6.
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mapping to a unique HHI score; an industry with a CR-4 of x%
could reflect an HHI value between ( ) and

.71

The 1968 Guidelines state that the DOJ will “ordinarily
challenge” mergers in highly concentrated markets where firms
of certain enumerated sizes acquire other firms of certain
enumerated sizes.72 In roughly equivalent terms, mergers
inducing a change in HHI of more than 30 points would trigger
a challenge.73 For less highly concentrated markets, mergers
resulting in an HHI increase of 50 or more would trigger a
challenge.74
In 1982 the DOJ promulgated a new set of merger
guidelines, in which the HHI replaced the four-firm
concentration ratio as the method of measuring industry
structure.75 The DOJ’s decision to embrace the HHI was
remarkable given that courts had mostly rejected or ignored
it.76 The change in methodology among DOJ lawyers reflected
an implicit acceptance of the criticisms of the CR-4 and was
also influenced substantially by the work of Herfindahl’s
mentor, George Stigler.77 The HHI had appeared in the legal
71. For a given concentration ratio, the lowest possible HHI
would occur in an industry with four equal-sized firms and a virtually
infinite number of other firms, each with a market share of close to
zero. The HHI’s upper bound for the same concentration ratio would
reflect an industry consisting of one firm with a 75% market share
and a virtually infinite number of other firms, each with a market
share of close to zero.
72. 1968 Merger Guidelines, supra note 21, at 6.
73. The Guidelines offer three examples: a firm of 4% market
share acquiring another firm of 4% or more; a firm of 10% acquiring a
firm of 2% or more; and a firm of 15% or more acquiring a firm of 1%
or more. These scenarios represent, respectively, minimum HHI
increases of 32, 40, and 30.
74. For example, a firm with a 5% market share acquiring
another firm of 5% or more (increasing HHI by 50 or more) would
ordinarily receive a challenge, as would a firm with a 15% market
share acquiring a firm of 3% or more (increasing HHI by 90 or more).
See 1968 Merger Guidelines, supra note 21, at 6.
75. See 1982 Merger Guidelines, supra note 52, at 11-15.
76. Prior to the 1982 Guidelines, only six judicial opinions had
mentioned the HHI. See Calkins, supra note 47, at 410.
77. See David Scheffman et al., Twenty Years of Merger
Guidelines Enforcement at the FTC: An Economic Perspective, 71
ANTITRUST L.J. 277, 283 (2003) (“The appeal of the HHI was that it
was related to Stigler’s ‘Theory of Oligopoly,’ which was the
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literature as early as 1969, when Richard Posner endorsed it,
and Areeda and Turner later gave it their approval, “albeit
without enthusiasm.”78 The FTC did not formally adopt the
DOJ guidelines until 1992, when the two issued a set of joint
guidelines, but it effectively endorsed the DOJ framework from
1982 onwards.79
The DOJ issued further versions of the Merger Guidelines
in 1984, 1992, 1997, and 2010. Although the wording varied
somewhat, the essential use of HHI in structural analysis
remained substantially the same.80 Classification of industrial
concentration levels expanded from two to three regions:
“highly concentrated” (HHI above 2,500), “moderately
concentrated” (HHI between 1,500 and 2,500), and
“unconcentrated” (HHI below 1,500).81 More subtly, policy
shifted from an examination of pre-merger market shares—
used in determining the CR-4—to an analysis of post-merger
shares.
The structural analysis thus considered the change in
industry HHI rather than making a static examination of the
merging firms’ market shares (although the two are directly
related).82 By focusing on the change in the index values, the
Merger Guidelines adhere to Herfindahl’s own beliefs about the
use of his index in that they use it comparatively rather than

foundation of the Guidelines’ collusion analysis (now known as
coordinated interaction).”).
78. Calkins, supra note 47, at 409-10.
79. See Scheffman et al., supra note 77, at 284.
80. A proviso barring the leading firm in an industry from
merging with a firm of 1% market share or more was dropped in the
1992 Guidelines. The subsequent guidelines did have several
substantive changes in other respects, in particular relating to the
use of efficiency as a defense of otherwise anticompetitive mergers.
See id.; Kolasky & Dick, supra note 59.
81. See 2010 Merger Guidelines, DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FTC,
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg-2010.pdf (last visited
Jan. 30, 2014) [hereinafter 2010 Merger Guidelines]. The 2010
revisions to the Guidelines increased the region thresholds
substantially. Previously, markets were highly concentrated if the
HHI level was greater than 1,800 and moderately concentrated
between 1,000 and 1,800. See 1997 Merger Guidelines, supra note 50,
at 14-15.
82. See 1997 Merger Guidelines, supra note 50.
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focusing on absolute HHI levels.83 The Guidelines recognize
that, all else equal, the more concentrated an industry is, the
more likely a given change in HHI will raise competitive
concerns. Nonetheless, the Guidelines do not set any maximum
HHI beyond which all mergers are presumptively
anticompetitive, as illustrated in Figure 3. Transactions
resulting in a moderately concentrated industry post-merger
“potentially raise significant competitive concerns and often
warrant scrutiny” if the HHI increases by more than 100
points.84 Those resulting in a highly concentrated post-merger
industry are treated similarly if the HHI increases between
100–200 points and are “presumed to be likely to enhance
market power” if the HHI increases by more than 200 points.85

Maximum HHI Increase
Without Competitive
Concerns

Figure 3.

1,500
1,200

900
600
300
500

1,000

1,500

2,000

2,500

Pre-Merger HHI

To the extent one can make a meaningful comparison
between the CR-4 system of the 1968 Guidelines and the HHI
scheme introduced in 1982, the threshold levels for regulatory
scrutiny are not wildly divergent.86 For its part, the DOJ
83. See Herfindahl, supra note 19, at 21-22 (“The usefulness of
the measure lies in providing a definite description of gross changes
and in furnishing a focus for further judgments about the data.”).
84. See 2010 Merger Guidelines, supra note 81, at 19.
85. See id.
86. The 1982 Guidelines state that “the critical HHI thresholds
at 1000 and 1800 correspond roughly to four-firm concentration ratios
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believed that the market share thresholds for merging firms
were comparable between the two sets of guidelines.87 In
contrast, the DOJ anticipated that its new thresholds for
industry concentration would be received as an overly
permissive departure from the 1968 Guidelines and thus chose
the original safe-harbor threshold of 1,000 “as much as a
political anchorage to windward as because anyone thought
that nicely round number was just right.”88
In practice, the government has not strictly adhered to the
numerical thresholds. The 1982 Merger Guidelines themselves
concede that “[o]ther things being equal, cases falling just
above and just below a threshold present comparable
competitive concerns.”89 An internal FTC study found that
during the 1980s the minimum level of HHI leading to merger
objections generally exceeded 1800 by a few hundred points.90
While this evidence might indicate a decreased reliance on
HHI,91 it is equally consistent with higher unofficial HHI
thresholds as part of the Reagan administration’s generally
laissez-faire economic policies.
III. Criticisms of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index
Two primary factors justify the use of the HHI in merger
evaluation. Sound economic theory links market structure, as
measured by the HHI, to market power, and by extension,
market performance. More practically, the Guidelines’ use of
the HHI provides an objective benchmark that mitigates the
ebb and flow of political and academic favor towards antitrust

of 50 percent and 70 percent, respectively.” 1982 Merger Guidelines,
supra note 52, at 11-15.
87. See William F. Baxter, Antitrust Policy, in AMERICAN
ECONOMIC POLICY IN THE 1980S 610 (Martin Feldstein ed., 1994).
88. Id.
89. 1982 Merger Guidelines, supra note 52, at 13. But the
Guidelines justify deviations from their bright-line rules by noting
“the numerical divisions suggest greater precision than is possible
with the available economic tools and information,” suggesting that in
the future more precision will be possible. Id.
90. See Scheffman et al., supra note 77, at 300.
91. See id.
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policy.92 Nonetheless, several criticisms lie against the HHI,
both in general and in particular, with regard to its use in
network industry mergers.
A.

Criticisms Applicable to All Markets

Herfindahl himself admitted that his index suffered the
deficiency of considering only two indicia of industry
behavior—the number of firms and the variance in market
share distribution.93 He recognized that other factors would
also play a role, in particular geographic dispersion of firms.94
The Merger Guidelines cleverly handle this issue by dividing
the inquiry into two steps: first market definition, then
concentration analysis. Because the relevant market inquiry
considers both geography and demand cross-elasticities,95 the
HHI implicitly includes those factors.
Other criticisms of the HHI broadly fall into two areas.
The first attack its use in practice, either through faulty or
inconsistent application or because of inappropriate
calibration. The second line of criticism focuses on the Index’s
theoretical underpinnings, arguing that it fails on a more
fundamental level.
1. Criticisms of the HHI in Practice
The Guidelines’ use of the HHI has garnered criticism for
its arbitrary numerical thresholds.96 Former Assistant
Attorney General William Baxter, who was primarily
responsible for the 1982 Guidelines, admitted as much,
conceding the “arbitrary” lines “have no magical qualities”
92. But for criticism of both the theoretical and practical
justifications, see Robert D. Joffe et al., Proposed Revisions of the
Justice Department’s Merger Guidelines, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1543
(1981).
93. See Herfindahl, supra note 19, at 19.
94. See id.
95. The Merger Guidelines specifically address geographic
markets and implicitly address demand cross-elasticities in their
SSNIP test. See 2010 Merger Guidelines, supra note 81, at 8-14.
96. See, e.g., Jay Greenfield, Beyond Herfindahl: Non-Structural
Elements of Merger Analysis, 53 ANTITRUST L.J. 229 (1984).
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beyond “the fact that we were born with ten fingers and have
gotten used to a base ten system.”97 However, this critique does
not really address the adequacy of the HHI per se, but merely
the details of its implementation.
A related argument posits that the precision and
sophistication of the HHI may cloak its limitations and create a
false impression of scientific accuracy in the courts.98
Exacerbating this problem, the argument continues, the
government’s discretion in market definition renders any
apparent concreteness in concentration thresholds illusory.99
Yet, it seems doubtful that judges intelligent enough to parse
the results of the CR-4 with skepticism would be duped into
blind acceptance of the government’s case solely on HHI
evidence. Moreover, any measure of concentration would fall
prey to this criticism of misleading accuracy; surely it is better
to have some objective standard in merger evaluation in the
interests of fairness and consistency.
Another criticism of the HHI highlights its potential to
lead to wide measurement errors. As Hirschman noted,
measurement errors of smaller firms’ market shares (perhaps
from incomplete data) lead to relatively minor fluctuations in
an industry’s HHI value.100 But if the errors involve larger
firms, the HHI calculation for the industry can produce large
errors.101 This argument overstates the problem, since the
Guidelines look at the change in HHI rather than absolute
values—other than as a threshold matter. The error would
presumably appear in both the pre- and post-merger
calculations, resulting in a de minimis distortion to the
increase in HHI. Moreover, any index of concentration will
suffer from measurement bias, and the HHI does not suffer
more in this regard than others.
Finally, the charge has been made that by lumping postmerger HHI into one of three regions, the DOJ does not treat
97. William F. Baxter, A Justice Department Perspective, 51
ANTITRUST L.J. 287, 292 (1982).
98. See Calkins, supra note 47, at 425.
99. See Steven C. Salop, Symposium on Mergers and Antitrust, 1
J. ECON. PERSP. 3, 10 (1987).
100. See HIRSCHMAN, supra note 4, at 157-62.
101. See Calkins, supra note 47, at 405.
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all mergers equally.102 Prior to the 2010 revisions, substantial
arbitrariness was possible. Given two mergers, one with a
higher HHI change could have passed muster under the former
Guidelines while the merger with a lesser change in HHI
triggered the presumption of anticompetitiveness.103 Consider
the two hypothetical industries given in Figure 4. In industry
A, a merger between the firms with market shares of 2% and
13% presumptively would have been anticompetitive under the
former Guidelines, whereas in industry B, the firm with a 2%
share could have merged with the firm having a 24% share
without any concern of antitrust action. Both mergers result in
an industry HHI of close to 1,800, and the merger sanctioned
by the Guidelines would raise HHI by nearly twice that of the
merger that was presumed anticompetitive.

102. See George G. Szpiro, A Note on the Equitable Treatment of
Mergers, 13 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 543 (1992). Szpiro
misunderstands the Merger Guidelines to focus on pre-merger HHI,
and offers no justification for his choice of just two of the potentially
infinite data points from which to extrapolate a linear relationship
between pre-merger HHI and the maximum permissible increase in
HHI.
103. See id. This disparity was possible because, under the
former Merger Guidelines, if a merger resulted in a moderately
concentrated industry, the HHI had to increase by more than 100
points before anticompetitive concerns were triggered. If the
resultant industry was highly concentrated, however, the HHI had to
increase by only 51 points to create a presumption of enhanced
market power. Under the current Guidelines, no merger raises
concerns if the HHI change does not exceed 100 points. Compare 2010
Merger Guidelines, supra note 81, with 1997 Merger Guidelines,
supra note 50.
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Figure 4.

Firm 1
Firm 2
Firm 3
Firm 4
Firm 5
Firm 6
Firm 7
Pre-merger HHI
Post-merger HHI
Change

Market Share
Industry A
Industry B
27%
24%
17%
17%
14%
17%
14%
16%
13%
12%
13%
12%
2%
2%
1,752
1,804
52

1,702
1,798
96

The 2010 revisions to the Merger Guidelines fixed this
problem by changing the HHI differentials necessary to trigger
anticompetitive concerns.104 In any event, this type of criticism
ignores both the letter and the spirit of the Guidelines. As
discussed above, the merger regulators’ analyses do not turn on
such technical minutiae.105 Not surprisingly, most of the
practical criticisms of the HHI arose around the time the DOJ
adopted the 1982 Merger Guidelines. In the three decades
since, these arguments have clearly proven unfounded. The
theoretical criticisms offer more substance.
2. Criticisms of the HHI in Theory
The most common theoretical attacks on the HHI center on
its weightings of the number of firms, n, versus their size
distribution, v. For instance, some commentators have
suggested that the HHI overstates the potential competitive
impact of mergers involving large and small firms (i.e., n is
overemphasized relative to v).106 Unless a small firm “is a
‘maverick’ or has substantial excess capacity and competitive
104. Compare 1997 Merger Guidelines, supra note 50, with 2010
Merger Guidelines, supra note 81.
105. See supra p. 121.
106. See Scheffman et al., supra note 77, at 283.
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costs[,]” its acquisition by a larger competitor should not raise
the concerns an HHI analysis might indicate.107
In the opposite vein, others have claimed that the HHI
understates the value of small competitors (i.e., v is
overemphasized relative to n).108 For example, if an industry
has a dominant firm with market share s1 and (n – 1) smaller,
equally sized firms, then the limit of the HHI is
as
. If
the dominant firm merges with one of the smaller firms, the
market’s HHI necessarily will increase. Previously, the
Guidelines held that any increase in HHI raised competitive
concerns if the post-merger HHI resulted in a concentrated
market. The problem was that if the dominant firm’s premerger market share were sufficiently large (under the
previous Guidelines, when s1>41%), the merger would raise
competitive concerns no matter how many additional firms
occupied the market. A superior index, the argument goes,
would not cap the effect of additional firms, no matter how
small.109 In other words, as the number of firms in a market
approaches infinity, the concentration index should approach
zero, no matter what the size distribution.110
The most recent Guidelines respond to this criticism by
imposing a 100-point buffer before scrutiny is triggered, even in
highly concentrated markets, because HHI increases of less
than 100 points “are unlikely to have adverse competitive
effects.”111 While the HHI does not approach zero as the
number of competitors becomes sufficiently large, the number
of competitors may now make a difference in whether the
regulators investigate a merger in a concentrated market. If a
dominant firm merges with one of its small but equally sized
competitors, HHI will never increase by more than 100 points—
no matter how large the dominant firm—if the firm has more
than 50 pre-merger competitors.112

107. Id.
108. See Finkelstein & Friedberg, supra note 17.
109. See id.
110. George Stigler has described such a measure as “stimulating
and appealing” although “it lacks any precise theoretical rationale.”
George J. Stigler, Comment, 76 YALE L.J. 718, 718 (1967).
111. 2010 Merger Guidelines, supra note 81, at 19.
112. For the HHI to increase by 100 points or more,
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Another theoretical criticism of the HHI points out its
inability to assess dynamic aspects of competition.113 The HHI
provides a snapshot of the “before” and “after” images of
market structure. But in the wake of a merger, sufficiently
large price increases may draw in other competitors,
deconcentrating the market. In the alternative, the presence of
potential entrants may restrain significant price increases
altogether. Dynamic models of concentration would recognize
that “cost savings are generally longer lived than
anticompetitive effects” and apply some sort of intertemporal
discount factor to the effects of increased concentration.114
However, such models make more sense when weighing the
costs and benefits of a merger in an efficiencies context—after
the HHI threshold has been reached.115
A final criticism of the HHI argues that as a structural
measure applied uniformly across industries, it misses the
industry-specific nuances relating structure to market power
and thus wholly fails to provide regulators with useful
information. For example, HHI provides no information about
barriers to entry, economies of scale or scope, rapidly changing
technology, or firm-specific characteristics, all of which may
bear on the degree of competition in the industry.116 I will make

(
(

)

(

(

) )

)

or
. The maximum value of n required to satisfy this
inequality is 51, which occurs when
. The 100-point buffer
produces interesting outcomes in near-monopoly markets. If the
dominant firm has a 99% market share and two other firms equally
split the remaining 1% of the market, then a merger between the
dominant firm and one of the other two firms will raise the HHI by
only 99 points—ordinarily an insufficient amount to trigger scrutiny.
113. See Joseph Farrell & Carl Shapiro, Horizontal Mergers: An
Equilibrium Analysis, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 107 (1990) (arguing that
market shares among both merging and non-merging firms will
change, necessitating an analysis of post-merger equilibrium to
determine the welfare effects).
114. See Scheffman et al., supra note 77, at 314.
115. See id.
116. See Geraldine Alpert, Is Structure All?, 53 ANTITRUST L.J.
255 (1984).
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a similar argument in the next section with respect to HHI’s
failure to account for network effects.
In fairness, attacking the HHI for failing to address every
individual industry peculiarity somewhat misses the point of
the index. The HHI offers a general framework for
approximating competitive effects. It acts as a gatekeeper in
ruling out cases in which consolidation presents no obvious
harm to consumers. In this respect, it may prove
underinclusive—committing the Type II error of allowing
undesirable mergers to go through. But if the HHI does raise a
red flag, the Merger Guidelines have alternative provisions to
address some of the characteristics that might make an
industry unique. For example, regulators consider barriers to
entry when determining the relevant market (a prerequisite to
applying the HHI), in that they affect the ability of firms to
effectuate a “small but significant and non-transitory increase
in price.”117 Economies of scale and scope should also receive
consideration when the government considers efficiencies that
would offset market power.
The HHI probably does provide the best general measure
of industrial concentration, and the Merger Guidelines have
the flexibility to apply it usefully in a variety of industry
settings. Discarding the HHI because it does not perfectly
forecast market power in every application would be senseless.
At the same time, when it becomes apparent that particular
types of industries do not fit well into the HHI mold for some
critical reason, the Guidelines can and should be adjusted to
account for that. I turn to such an argument now.
B.

Criticism of the HHI As Applied to Network Industries

Networks
contain nodes
connected
by
links.118
Structurally, a network can take many forms. One common

117. 1982 Merger Guidelines, supra note 52, at 9.
118. See generally LAWRENCE J. WHITE, U.S. PUBLIC POLICY
TOWARD NETWORK INDUSTRIES (1999) (offering a thorough overview of
network industry economics and the attendant policy issues);
Nicholas Economides, The Economics of Networks, 14 J. INT’L J.
INDUS. ORG. 673, 674 (1996) (providing another excellent discussion of
network industry economics).
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arrangement, called a star or hub-and-spoke network, involves
one or more common nodes (or “hubs”) connected uniquely to
many other nodes (or “spokes”).119 This form of network occurs,
for instance, in the communications and airline industries.
However, various topographical forms of networks exist in
many diverse industries, and the term as used here in an
economics context should be distinguished from its colloquial
reference to specific products, such as hardware and
software.120
The fundamental characteristic of a network industry is
“positive consumption and production externalities.”121 These
externalities occur when “the value of a unit of the good
increases with the expected number of units to be sold.”122 In
other words, users of a network good or service derive value
both from the good or service itself and also from the direct or
indirect effects of additional users. Computer operating
systems offer a classic example: consumers benefit from the
functionality that an operating system provides. Additionally,
when they purchase a popular operating system, consumers
benefit from not having to learn other platforms on computers
outside the home (a direct benefit) and from having a wide
variety of applications to choose from (an indirect benefit).
Positive consumption externalities not surprisingly have
an impact on demand. As the expected number of users of a
network commodity increases, so does the price a given number
of potential users will pay—i.e., the demand curve itself shifts
up, although it remains downward sloping.123 As an
illustration, consider a hypothetical single-firm network
industry in which a finite number of potential consumers have
a willingness to pay that is uniformly distributed between 0
and a when everyone uses the network. That is, the number of
potential customers equals the number of actual customers at a

119. See Economides, supra note 118, at 675.
120. See Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Antitrust Enforcement in Dynamic
Network Industries, 43 ANTITRUST BULL. 859, 861 (1998).
121. Economides, supra note 118, at 678.
122. Id. (emphasis omitted).
123. See id.
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price of zero.124 This implies the familiar linear demand curve.
In accordance with the positive consumption externality, each
potential customer discounts her willingness to pay by , the
ratio of actual to potential customers, which is equivalent to
the share of the market served by the firm.125 In equilibrium,
(
) where P is the price charged.126 Figure 5 depicts
this relationship.

124. This example is adapted from Jeffrey Rohlfs, A Theory of
Interdependent Demand for a Communications Service, 5 BELL J.
ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 16 (1974).
125. Of course there is no reason other than ease of exposition to
assume a linear relationship between δ and willingness to pay. It may
well be the case that there is a critical mass of δ somewhere between
0 and 1, before which there is an increasing marginal willingness to
pay and beyond which a decreasing marginal willingness to pay.
126. As a proof, let x denote the large but finite number of
potential customers, and Q the number of actual customers. Given
the uniform willingness to pay, Q = x(1 – P/a) or P = a(1 – Q/x) = a(1 –
) when
= 1. Given that each potential customer discounts her
willingness to pay by , the inverse demand curve becomes
(
) for
[0, 1]. For an elaboration, see PEPALL ET AL., supra
note 29, at 615-20.
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Figure 5.
P
𝑎
4

C
D

D’

A

c

B

δ

0
0

1

At any positive price greater than or equal to marginal cost
c and less than a/4, two potential equilibria exist. For instance,
at both points A and B, demand equals supply, the additional
demand at B stemming from the additional value that the
greater number of network users generates. At D the number
of network users creates value exceeding that reflected in the
price, and additional consumers (those with lower willingness
to pay at any network size) will want to join the network. In
equilibrium, D will shift to D’.
Thus, the upward sloping side of the demand curve
represents a “critical mass.”127 At points to the left of this
curve, the price is too high to sustain the number of users.
Those with the lowest willingness to pay will drop out of the
127. See Rohlfs, supra note 124, at 29.
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market.128 But the reduced number of users diminishes the
value of the network to the remaining users, and more drop
out. The effect snowballs until no users remain and the
network fails. To the right of the critical mass the opposite
effect takes hold, as illustrated by the move from D to D’. The
critical mass curve itself represents a set of unstable
equilibria.129 Outcomes along the curve remain tenable only so
long as no exogenous forces perturb the steady state.
It is important to distinguish network industries from
natural monopolies. Industries of both types have a tendency
towards consolidation, albeit for different reasons. Natural
monopolies possess increasing returns to scale, meaning that
as they increase output their average costs decrease. Typically,
this occurs when a firm incurs high fixed costs and low
marginal costs. Larger firms will thus maintain cost
advantages over smaller firms and in the long term the
industry becomes a small oligopoly or monopoly in the absence
of government intervention.
By contrast, network industries tend towards monopoly
not because of increasing returns to scale—although they often
exhibit that trait—but because, all else equal, consumers
derive greater utility purchasing from firms with more
customers. Even in a network industry with decreasing returns
to scale (i.e., where average unit costs increase with output),
consumers will purchase a more expensive product if a
sufficiently large number of other consumers use it.
For example, an electric power company has high startup
costs but relatively low marginal costs—once the expensive
infrastructure is in place, it costs virtually nothing to add an
additional user and its marginal cost is essentially the cost of
electricity production. At the same time, there are no direct
benefits and few indirect benefits to one user of adding
additional users. The electric power industry would therefore
be classified as a natural monopoly but not a network industry.

128. This raises the question of how a network firm reaches its
critical mass in the first place without the help of a subsidy or belowcost pricing, an issue beyond the scope of this discussion.
129. See Rohlfs, supra note 124, at 29.
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The telecommunications industry is classified as a natural
monopoly for reasons similar to the electric power industry.
Telecommunications also qualifies as a network industry
because there are direct and indirect benefits to one user as the
number of other users increase.
The apparel industry serves as an example of a network
industry that is not a natural monopoly. Fixed costs are low
relative to variable costs, most costs increase at least
proportionally with output, and no appreciable economies of
scale exist.130 On the other hand, as more and more individuals
don a particular brand of clothing, it becomes increasingly
fashionable and other consumers’ willingness to pay for it
increases.131
This distinction between industries with network effects
and natural monopoly industries is important for policy
reasons. The government typically protects consumers from a
natural monopoly by allowing the monopoly but strictly
regulating prices, profits, or both.132 No such rationale supports
the imposition of similarly draconian measures on network
industries that do not exhibit natural monopoly tendencies;
consumers may in fact benefit from the concentration even in
the presence of higher prices.
The use of the HHI in horizontal merger regulation
presumes that consumer welfare suffers as firms increase their
market share and take advantage of the consequent increase in
market power to raise prices. In network industries, the
validity of this presumption comes into question. Consumer
130. See Yoram Gutgeld & Damon Beyer, Are You Going Out of
Fashion?, 3 MCKINSEY Q. 55, 58 (1995).
131. But only to a point there are also negative network effects
that eventually outweigh the positive ones associated with more
users. On the one hand, an increasing number of users reassures
consumers that the garment has value. On the other hand, as an
article of clothing becomes more ubiquitous each wearer feels less
unique and the brand value becomes diluted. See Peter M. Kort et al.,
Brand Image and Brand Dilution in the Fashion Industry, 42
AUTOMATICA 1363 (2006).
132. See generally LUÍS M.B. CABRAL, INTRODUCTION TO
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 75-77 (2000).
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surplus—the traditional measure of consumer welfare—is the
difference between the amount consumers actually pay for a
product and the aggregate amount they would be willing to pay
for the product.133 Consumer surplus should fall when the postmerger price rises because of enhanced market power—the
competitive effect.134 Conversely, consumers will pay more for a
product with positive consumption externalities following a
merger that expands the network size. This increased
willingness to pay tends to increase consumer surplus—the
network effect.135
On balance then, it remains uncertain whether a network
industry merger will increase or decrease consumer surplus.
The result depends on which effect dominates: the competitive
or the network effect. The next section explores an economic
model of this relationship and examines situations in which the
benefits from the network effect outweigh the losses to
consumers from lessened competition. The model takes as its
starting point the basic Cournot model of competition, with its
direct link to the HHI.136
IV. A Model of Competition in Network Industries
A.

The Basic Model of Network Industry Competition

In the basic model n > 1 firms face x > 0 consumers, where
x is assumed to be a sufficiently large number. Willingness to
pay is distributed uniformly among consumers on [0, a]. Thus,
firms face a linear demand function at a given level of output.
133. See, e.g., WALTER NICHOLSON, MICROECONOMIC THEORY:
BASIC PRINCIPLES AND EXTENSIONS 145-47, 317-18 (9th ed. 2005). In
general, different consumers would be willing to pay different
amounts for the same product. It is this phenomenon that gives rise
to the downward slope of the demand curve. At any given price,
different consumers will realize different surpluses. Consumer
surplus for a market is the sum of surpluses across all consumers
whose willingness to pay equals or exceeds the price charged.
134. See Economides, supra note 118, at 691.
135. See id.
136. See supra pp. 115-116.
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The importance of the latter limitation will be explained
shortly.
Firms compete à la Cournot in that each firm
{
}
simultaneously selects its output, qj, taking into account the
demand function and the industry cost function. Each firm
incurs zero fixed costs and a constant marginal cost of cj = c.
Because costs must be positive and less than the amount at
least one person is willing to pay, c is confined to the interval
(0, a).
Consumers’ willingness to pay also depends on the
network size of the firm from which they make their purchase.
Accordingly, the demand function D that a particular firm faces
is discounted by the fraction of the market that firm captures,
where pj is the price
. In other words,
)
(
∑
. This departs from the
charged by firm j and
Cournot model in that firms do not necessarily sell the good at
the same price in equilibrium. Larger firms—those with
greater output—will charge a higher price for their product.
Nonetheless, the undiscounted prices must be equal regardless
.
of output to avoid arbitrage, i.e.,
Accordingly, the undiscounted market demand function is
(

)

and the inverse demand function is
)

(
where

∑

. Firm j will then charge

(

) , yielding

the profit function
[ (

)

]

In equilibrium,137 each firm will maximize profits when

137. Because the profit function is a third degree polynomial with
respect to qj, the first order conditions capture both relative maxima
and minima. The additional constraints implemented below will
eliminate the solutions involving relative minima.
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Solving the above system of n first order conditions yields
{
} where i firms will optimize at
solutions of the form
and (n – i) firms will optimize at
. This follows
from the fact that the n first order conditions are symmetrical
quadratics. Thus, there will be ( ) solutions for each value of i
and a total of
unconstrained solutions.
To obtain values for
and , the system of x first order
conditions can be reduced to
[(
]
)
(
)
{
[
]
(
)
which has the solution
(
)(
)]
√ [
[
]
(
)
[

√ [

(

)(

)]
]

(
)
{
Additionally, there may be corner solutions in which
is
138
an optimal response to some
and vice versa.
In order for the solutions to make economic sense, they
must conform to the constraints set forth above as well as the
requirement that both output and profits are positive for all
firms:
{

or

or {

{
except for corner solutions where

138. Both interior and corner solutions are Nash equilibria. That
is, each firm produces at the most profitable level given the
production decisions of every other firm, leaving no firm with an
incentive to deviate from its equilibrium output.
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)
{

}

or
{

(

)
{

}

and 0 < i < n.
It turns out that the only valid interior solutions occur
when i = n (all firms produce at ) and
. There
(
)
also exist corner solutions where g firms choose to produce at
(

when

√ (
(
√

(

√ )

(

)))

and (n – g) firms choose not to produce

)
(

)

.

The different restrictions on values of for interior and
corner solutions has important economic implications. The
term can be thought of as the industry cost structure, as it
represents the industry marginal cost relative to the maximum
amount anyone would pay for the product. It falls on the range
(0, 1), which can be divided into four distinct regions.
At sufficiently low industry cost structures, only interior
solutions are possible or, put differently, all firms will choose to
produce. From an economic interpretation, even if all g < n of
the producing firms in a potential corner solution could
credibly threaten to set their output as if the other (n – g) firms
had left the market, the other firms would still find it
profitable to enter as a result of sufficiently low costs. This in
turn would induce the g firms to reduce their actual from their
threatened output until the entire industry wound up at the
interior equilibrium.
When industry costs exceed a certain level, a credible
threat by g firms to set output at the g-firm oligopoly level will
deter the remaining firms from entry. No positive amount of
production by those (n – g) firms will yield positive profits for
them, resulting in corner solutions. At the same time, an
interior equilibrium in which all firms set output equal to
remains feasible.
As the cost structure continues to rise, at some point the
viability of interior solutions will end while at least some
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corner solutions will continue to be possible. The number of
firms a given cost structure can support will decrease as the
cost structure increases until only one firm can profitably
produce. As the cost structure increases, firms can only recoup
their greater costs by charging a higher price, which in turn
can only be supported by a sufficiently large network. When
, not even a
the cost structure exceeds a certain point,
monopoly firm can make a profit and the only possible outcome
will be for all firms to shut down.
Figure 6 illustrates these regions and the corresponding
shares of the total market served as well as consumer surplus
for the simple case where n = 2. To borrow a physics analogy,
Figure 6 resembles a critical phase transition: over a certain
range, either of two potential outcomes may occur, the actual
one reached a result of path-dependence.139 Left to the invisible
hand, the market could settle at the socially inferior outcome,
however defined.140

139. See generally PHILIP BALL, CRITICAL MASS: HOW ONE THING
LEADS TO ANOTHER (2004) (discussing how phase transitions, pathdependence, and other concepts from the field of physics relate to
social science phenomena, including economic and legal applications).
140. Cf. Rubinfeld, supra note 120, at 862-63 (describing a Pareto
inferior outcome in which market forces cause a dominant network
firm to drive a rival with superior technology out of the market
because of incompatible standards). Often when two firms occupy the
market, they will compete fiercely and the equilibrium can shift
suddenly and dramatically, a phenomenon known as “tipping.” See id.
at 865-66.
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By comparison, the traditional n-firm Cournot model
would not permit corner solutions. As long as all firms face the
same constant marginal cost, it follows that if one firm finds it
profitable to produce then all firms will find it profitable. In
this model of network industry competition, nonproducing
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firms could be thought of as potential entrants that become
actual entrants if the costs structure is permissively low.
B.

Accounting for Residual Value

One deficiency in the model thus far presented is that it
fails to account for residual value—that is, it treats a product
produced by a network with zero users as worthless, having no
intrinsic value apart from its network benefits. This extreme
assumption rarely if ever holds true in the real world. As an
illustration, consider a word processing program. It qualifies as
a network product because its value to each user increases with
the total number of users. However, even if no one uses the
program, it may still offer value to a potential purchaser in
that it performs a useful function.
Residual value will vary considerably from product to
product. For example, an airline network will offer a very high
residual value to customers. Although passengers no doubt
appreciate some benefits of a larger network,141 their
immediate concern is to travel on a particular itinerary.
Depending on their elasticity of demand, air travelers will
sacrifice the conveniences of a larger network to some degree
for a lower fare. Furthermore, negative network externalities
may offset the positive ones, to which anyone who has ever
been trapped in a middle seat on a crowded flight can attest.
Computer operating systems offer a moderate degree of
residual value. Although the products offer functionality
regardless of network size, the number of other users of a
particular piece of software is an important consideration.
Learning to operate multiple software programs where one
would suffice results in a costly waste of time.
At the other end of the spectrum, credit cards typically
offer very little residual value to users. A credit card accepted
by only one vendor provides extremely limited utility to
consumers. Although such cards do exist, vendors must usually
141. Most of these network benefits are indirect, such as
frequency of flights, fewer connections, nearby alternative airports in
case of service disruptions, better frequent flyer reward programs,
etc.
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dispense them for free or even with compensation for their use,
i.e., at a negative price. Retailers typically offer a discount on
the first purchase made with their store credit card as an
incentive to acquire it. In contrast, large credit card networks
like MasterCard and Visa frequently impose an annual fee and
high annual percentage rate on their card members, who
willingly incur these costs because of the widespread
acceptance of the cards.
Because residual value is a factor of variable importance to
demand for network products, it is desirable to capture this
effect in the model and to examine its effects. Let denote a
product’s residual value, which can take values on the range [0,
1). In this more robust model,
(

)

In the case where = 1, no network effects are present and the
model collapses into the garden variety Cournot setup. When
= 0, the product has no residual value, exactly as in the basic
model presented above.
Similar to the basic model, interior equilibrium solutions
are characterized by i firms producing at
and (n – i) firms
producing at
such that in equilibrium
(

(

))

√

( (
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(
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Unlike in the basic model, valid interior equilibria can exist,
subject to certain constraints,142 for values of i greater than
zero and less than or equal to n. In other words, this more
robust model has the potential for more interior solutions than
the basic model. It also allows for corner solutions.
For example, a two-firm industry could reach one of five
different equilibria under certain parameter values. Figure 7
illustrates this for the case when
and = .28.

142. These constraints are set forth in the Appendix.

41

2014]

WHEN BIGGER IS BETTER

935

Figure 7
𝑞
Firm 1’s best response

A
𝜋

B

C
𝜋
Firm 2’s best response
𝜋 𝜋
D
E

𝑞

There are three interior solutions. At point C, each firm sells to
approximately 28.4% of the potential market, x. At point D,
firm 1 sells to approximately 44.1% of the potential market and
firm 2 sells to 9.6%. Point B is the reverse of point D. Point C is
not Pareto superior to either B or D—one firm will realize a
greater profit and one a lesser profit than when their output is
unequal.
Additionally, there are two corner solutions, points A and
E, where one firm produces at the monopoly level, selling to
approximately 51.5% of the potential market, and the other
firm chooses not to produce. The non-producing firm cannot
make a profit at any positive level of output given the
producing firm’s output choice.
For the purposes of the next section—evaluating the effect
of mergers on consumer welfare—it is helpful to limit the
number of potential equilibria. For that reason, it will be
assumed that in the initial state all firms set output
identically, equal to
and corresponding to point C above.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss2/8

42

936

PACE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34:2

This has the advantage of requiring the fewest restrictions on
parameter values. In particular, it is the only possible interior
equilibrium when
.
C.

The Effect of Mergers on Consumer Welfare

The best way to evaluate the welfare of consumers under
given market conditions is to measure the surplus S that they
realize.143 This model allows for two different prices
concurrently in equilibrium, owing to the different discounts
consumers apply to their willingness to pay for networks of
unequal size. To evaluate consumer surplus, I calculate the
aggregate consumer surplus at undiscounted prices and apply
the discount for each network size in proportion to each
network’s share of the total output. In other words,
(

∫

)

(

(

(

)

)
(

)

)

or
[1]
As discussed in the preceding section, this Article will
investigate only equilibrium solutions where all firms produce
units of output. Equation [1] can then be simplified by
setting i equal to n, yielding
) (
(
) )
(
[2]
[(

(

)

)(

(

(

)

)

(

)

(

(

)

))]

The expanded equation will still prove useful for evaluating
consumer surplus in the short term.
The model thus far presented predicts the outcome of
competition in network industries for a given number of firms
facing a given cost structure. It provides an illustration of the
competitive landscape in the steady state that precedes a
merger, but offers little insight as to the market structure that
results following a merger. This Article will consider two
simple cases of the post-merger structure—one short term and
one long term. These two cases present two extremes of the
possible structural outcomes of a merger.

143. See supra pp. 133-34.
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In the immediate aftermath of a merger, the overall
production in the market remains substantially the same, the
major difference being that one larger firm produces the
amount of output previously contributed by two smaller firms.
The Merger Guidelines take essentially a short run view in
their application of the HHI.144 In the long run, the merged
firm will likely cut back on production to some extent,
depending on demand elasticities. Other firms in the industry
may increase their output.145 In the most sanguine of worlds
(from the consumer’s standpoint), the remaining firms will
eventually end up once more with roughly equal market
shares.
Accordingly, the short run case assumes that one merged
while the remaining (n – 2)
firm produces output equal to
firms continue to produce output equal to . The long run case
assumes that after the merger all (n – 1) firms produce at
where
. In both cases, the pre-merger consumer
surplus is exactly the amount from equation [2].
For the short run case, we can utilize equation [1], letting
. The post-merger consumer surplus therefore is
[ ( ) (
(
)(
) )]
[3]
Subtracting [2] from [3] yields the quantity

144. In considering the change in HHI the Guidelines assume
static market shares follow the merger and do not incorporate a
dynamic equilibrium analysis. See supra p. 114 and note 50.
145. For empirical evidence, see John R. Baldwin & Paul K.
Gorecki, Mergers Placed in the Context of Firm Turnover, in 5
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANNUAL RESEARCH
CONFERENCE 53 (1990) (finding significant declines in market shares
for plants acquired in horizontal mergers); Klaus Gugler et al., The
Effects of Mergers: An International Comparison, 21 INT’L J. INDUS.
ORG. 625 (2003) (considering international data and finding
consistently reduced sales among merging firms); Dennis C. Mueller,
Mergers and Market Share, 67 REV. ECON. & STAT. 259 (1985)
(conducting large-scale study that found merging firms lost market
share relative to non-merging firms); Martin Pesendorfer, Horizontal
Mergers in the Paper Industry, 34 RAND J. ECON. 495 (2003) (finding
that 74.1% of merging firms lost market share).
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which is always positive. Therefore, in the short run case postmerger consumer surplus will always exceed pre-merger
surplus by the amount in equation [4] when two identically
sized network firms combine.
The long run case offers similar but more qualified results.
For most cost structures, consumer surplus will increase after
a network industry merger, given a sufficiently low residual
value. Figure 8 provides an illustration.
Figure 8.
𝑐
𝑎

𝑐
𝑎

1

1
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θ
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The shaded areas represent feasible parameter combinations
(i.e., those that produce profitable outcomes before and after
the merger). The darker regions indicate parameter values for
which the post-merger consumer surplus exceeds the premerger surplus.
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This is not to say that mergers involving products with
sufficiently low residual value will evince unequivocally good
results; merely that such mergers will result in increased
consumer surplus. There may of course be important
considerations other than immediate welfare maximization, as
will be discussed in the next part.
Regardless of the relative merits of welfare maximization
versus other objectives, the long-term equilibrium case
highlights the importance of proper merger evaluation by
regulators. Although in many circumstances network industry
mergers will increase consumer surplus, in many other
circumstances such mergers will not be desirable from a public
policy perspective.
V.

A Suggested Approach for Incorporating Network Effects
into Merger Evaluation

The usefulness of HHI analysis varies with the degree to
which an industry exhibits network externalities. Prior to their
HHI analysis but subsequent to market definition, antitrust
regulators should attempt to determine the residual value of
the relevant products. In terms of the model above, regulators
should attempt to estimate . The greater the residual value,
the less impact network externalities will have on post-merger
consumer welfare.
Figure 8 also suggests a second consideration: cost. All
else equal, a network industry with a greater marginal cost
structure is more likely to experience an increase in consumer
welfare from consolidation. When the number of firms in a
network industry decreases, the industry output decreases, the
price increases and the output per firm increases. The first two
of these phenomena tend to decrease consumer surplus while
the third tends to increase it, making the overall change in
surplus uncertain. However, as the cost structure increases,
the proportional increase in output per firm increases whereas
the proportional decrease in industry output and increase in
price both diminish in magnitude. As a result, the change in
consumer surplus from industry consolidation—although not
necessarily positive for all values of marginal cost—will
increase with the marginal cost structure.
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It is important then to understand both the amount of
residual value attributable to a product and its marginal cost of
production when evaluating network industry mergers. The
higher the product’s residual value and the lower its cost, the
more the industry resembles a “traditional” industry and the
more insight a subsequent HHI analysis will reveal. On the
other hand, the HHI will provide scant guidance when
evaluating mergers involving products with low residual values
and high marginal costs of production.
The HHI may still play a useful role in the regulation of
mergers in which network effects dominate. As acknowledged
at the outset, increased concentration may influence industry
behavior in anticompetitive ways other than through the price
mechanism. For instance, a lack of competition could in theory
suppress innovation, which would ultimately weigh on
consumer utility.146 Moreover, as networks grow large, firms
can attempt to stifle competition by reducing the
interoperability between their dominant networks and those of
smaller rivals.147
Mergers will also have the result of suppressing total
market output and raising price, similar to the difference
146. See JOHN E. KWOKA, JR. & LAWRENCE J. WHITE, THE
ANTITRUST REVOLUTION: ECONOMICS, COMPETITION, AND POLICY 42021 (4th ed. 2004) [hereinafter THE ANTITRUST REVOLUTION].
Empirical evidence in a non-network context suggests otherwise. See
Richard Blundell et al., Market Share, Market Value and Innovation
in a Panel of British Manufacturing Firms, 66 REV. ECON. STUD. 529
(1999).
147. For example, in the U.S. government’s monopolization suit
against Microsoft, the government alleged, inter alia, that Microsoft
had leveraged its considerable market power and reduced
interoperability. For an illuminating discussion of the case and
network issues involved, see Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Maintenance of
Monopoly: U.S. v. Microsoft, in THE ANTITRUST REVOLUTION, supra
note 146, at 476. Preventing network mergers that substantially
increase concentration may combat such anticompetitive behavior.
However, given the unstable and rapidly changing competitive
dynamics in network industries, merger policy alone may not
adequately guard against such concerns.

47

2014]

WHEN BIGGER IS BETTER

941

between the interior and corner solution outcomes illustrated
in Figure 6 above. To the extent government policy favors low
prices and market access over consumer surplus, even mergers
with substantial network benefits may invite scrutiny.
For instance, if the network in question involved a
telecommunications service, a policymaker might wish to
maximize the number of consumers with access to some
network, regardless of size. One means of achieving that
outcome would be to prohibit large telecommunications
mergers. A more efficient outcome would nonetheless allow
consolidation; the government could increase network access
through a subsidy or by creating a legal monopoly that could
price discriminate, if possible.148
Although an unconsolidated industry in some sense
compensates consumers with lower prices, society as a whole
shoulders the opportunity cost of using smaller, less effective
networks rather than larger ones with critical mass. The premerger equilibrium often will not capture the bulk of the
positive network externalities. In any event, the government
should acknowledge the HHI’s inherent limitations in the
network context regardless of extent to which it continues to
rely on the index.
The DOJ and FTC could address these network issues in a
variety of ways, ranging from a radical transformation of the
current horizontal merger evaluation process to a minor
tweaking of the existing guidelines. On one end of the
spectrum, the agencies could choose to completely revamp their
processes and adopt a dynamic model, such as the one
presented above, which incorporates the concept of residual
value.149 If such a model indicated a lack of significant network
effects or, alternatively, if it produced an inconclusive or
insubstantial prediction of changes in consumer welfare,
regulators might then use the HHI as a tiebreaker.

148. See PEPALL ET AL., supra note 29, at 620.
149. See Farrell & Shapiro, supra note 113, at 107-08 (calling for
a dynamic “equilibrium analysis” rather than the static structural
model embodied in the HHI, although not specifically addressing the
issue of network industries or residual value).
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Residual value, while not commonly calculated at present,
should not present too difficult a challenge for government
economists. Standard econometric techniques could easily
estimate its value for a product made by several different
competitors. Even in markets with a high degree of
concentration and thus fewer data points, economists could still
obtain a reasonable approximation of residual value by
augmenting the data set with data from other time periods and
comparable industries.
The more intractable problem, from an empirical
perspective, is how to model the discount function. Even if
regulators could estimate a product’s value both when no one
uses it and when everyone does, they still need to devise a
function, which estimates a product’s value for all intermediate
network sizes. The model above assumed a linear relationship,
but that may only infrequently hold true. In fact, the function
may not even be strictly increasing, but may reach a maximum
and then start to decrease, as in the fashion industry
example.150
Given the time and other constraints faced by government
regulators, such economic modeling may prove impractical. The
discount function likely will differ substantially from industry
to industry, necessitating a longer period of time to review
mergers, reducing transparency and running the risk of
reaching inconsistent results. Regulators could nonetheless
incorporate a network effects analysis into their current
practices.
Residual value is neither an abstruse concept nor difficult
to approximate without resort to statistical data. If the
antitrust authorities examine a merger in which the relevant
product has a low residual value, they should proceed with
their HHI analysis knowing it presents only one side of the
post-merger landscape. Network effects, if not formally
modeled prior to the HHI analysis, should at a minimum
receive treatment similar to efficiencies—as an offset to a
presumptively anticompetitive increase in the HHI score. The
Merger Guidelines could easily adopt such a change without
abandoning their existing framework.
150. See supra p. 133.
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VI. Conclusion
Despite the allure of efficiencies and market dominance,
one wonders why firms would choose to merge in the first
place, given that mergers frequently prove unprofitable for the
acquiring company.151 Nonetheless, mergers among network
firms can bring about substantial consumer benefits, even after
taking into account the likely price increases from more
concentrated market power. At the moment, the Merger
Guidelines give short shrift to such network benefits, and their
reliance on the HHI lies at the core.
The HHI serves a useful role in measuring changes in
industrial concentration. In many industries it provides a
reasonable initial indication, prior to an efficiencies calculation,
of harm to consumers from potential consolidation. In network
industry mergers, however, the presumption of harm from
concentration obfuscates rather than clarifies the situation.
The strength of the DOJ and FTC’s approach to the Merger
Guidelines over the past thirty years has been their willingness
to modify the Guidelines to better reflect economic realities.
The beneficial effect of large networks to consumers is well
documented
and
our
antitrust
regulators
should
correspondingly adjust their approach.

151. See Gregor Andrade et al., New Evidence and Perspectives
on Mergers, 15 J. ECON. PERSP. 103 (2001).
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Appendix: Parameter Constraints for Interior Solutions
General constraints: {
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